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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Federal Income Taxation: Proceeds From "Bootstrap Sale"
of a Business to Charity Given Capital Gains Treatment
Respondent taxpayers transferred all the stock of their closely
held corporation, Clay Brown & Company, to a tax-exempt
organization, the Institute, in return for its note, payable over 10
years.' The Institute made no downpayment and assumed no
liability on the note. The Institute liquidated the Corporation,
sold the current assets to Fortuna Mills, Inc., a corporation newly
formed by the taxpayers' lawyer,2 and paid the taxpayers a small
part of the proceeds as a downpayment. For security on its note,
the Institute had given respondents a mortgage on the fixed
assets, which were leased by the Institute to Fortuna in return
for 80 percent of Fortuna's profits from operation of the business.
The Institute retained 10 percent of its percentage of the lease
receipts and passed along the remaining 90 percent to respondents
to apply on the note. As part of the agreement one of the peti-
tioners was employed as the general manager of Fortuna with
substantially the same powers as he had prior to the sale. Subse-
quently, Fortuna suffered business reverses and shut down opera-
tions. Rather than foreclose their lien, the taxpayers accepted
90 percent of the proceeds of the Institute's sale of the fixed assets
in satisfaction of its note. The Commissioner attempted to tax
respondents' proceeds from the transactions as ordinary income.
The Ninth Circuit sustained the determination below that the
transfer of stock was the sale of a capital asset within the mean-
ing of the Internal Revenue Code,4 and permitted taxation of the
gain at capital gains rates. Commissioner v. Brown, 325 F.2d 313
(9th Cir. 1963), cert. granted, 377 U.S. 962 (1964) (No. 1041),
affirming 37 T.C. 461 (1961).
The type of transaction attacked in Brown is advantageous to
1. The notes were payable in the amount of $1,800,000. Net worth of the
corporation at the time of transfer was determined to be $1,050,000. All pay-
ments on the notes were to be made from future earnings of the business.
2. Fortuna was organized with $25,000 of capital stock, all of which was
held by taxpayers' attorney.
3. The sale of the assets by the Institute was in pursuance of an agree-
ment entered into by it and the taxpayers at the time the business reversals
became critical.
4. "The term 'long-term capital gain' means gain from the sale or exchange
of a capital asset held for more than 6 months, if and to the extent such gain
is taken into account in computing gross income." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954,
§ 1222(3).
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both the seller and the tax-exempt" purchaser, if constructed
within the narrow confines of the Internal Revenue Code.! It is
a form of "bootstrap sale" of a business. The essence of a boot-
strap sale is that the earnings of the business itself provide the
funds with which the purchase is made.7 Because it is possible
for a charitable organization to receive tax free income from the
business, it can pay a higher price or shorten the repayment
period by making larger installment payments than the seller
could receive in the open market. Even though the sale permits
the seller to "bail out" past8 profits and to receive his payments
in installments,9 the transaction likely qualifies for capital gains
treatment. By profitably liquidating his business over a period
of years, the seller can avoid the risk of not being able to find a
cash purchaser when he reaches retirement. In addition, his prop-
5. Income of charitable and some other organizations is exempt from
taxation. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501. Income of organizations operated for
charitable, religious, scientific, or educational purposes is exempt from taxation
so long as no part of the net income "inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder." INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
6. Care must be taken to avoid Congress' attempt in 1950 to curtail such
transactions. See notes 33-35 infra and accompanying text.
7. In this paper the term more restrictively refers to such a transaction
in which the purchaser is an exempt organization. See generally Lanning, Tax
Erosion and the "Bootstrap Sale" of a Business, 108 U. PA. L. REv. 623 (1960);
MacCracken, Selling a Business to a Charitable Foundation, U. So. CAL. 1954
TAx INsT. 205; Moore & Dohan, Sales, Churches and Monkeyshines, 11 TAX
L. REV. 87 (1955).
8. A significant part of the appreciated value of a business likely reflects
past earnings and profits which were locked into the business. For example,
in the instant case there were $448,471.63 in retained earnings at the date of
sale. Had they been paid out they would have been subject to ordinary pro-
gressive taxation in the hands of the seller. By selling the business the tax-
payer is able to remove ("bail out") these profits at capital gains rates as
part of his gain. See generally Alexander & Landis, Bail-Outs and the Internal
Revenue Code of 1954, 65 YALE LJ. 909 (1956); Dean, Rules Governing Pre-ferred Stock Bail-Outs, N.Y.U. 14TH INsT. oN FED. TAX 691 (1956).
9. Income received on the installment basis from a sale is reported under
INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 453(a). This section requires determination of the
percentage of the total sales price which represents taxable gain over the basis
of the item sold. As each installment is received, an amount equal to this
percentage times the installment is taxable to its recipient at the rates then
applicable.
The Code does not indicate whether or not the capital gains provisions
and § 453 may be applied concurrently. However, since the decision rendered
in Carl G. Dreymann, 11 T.C. 153, 163 (1948), the Commissioner has not
asserted that when a taxpayer reports on the installment basis he should be
deprived of the benefit of capital gains treatment.
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erty is readied for estate tax and probate purposes. 0 In Brown,
the principal seller remained active in the management of the
concern, which, in his mind, probably reduced the risk of incom-
petent management ruining the business before the installment
payments were completed. The charity risks nothing, receives
some net income over the installment payment period, and in
the end owns the assets and reaps most of the income of a profit-
able business.
The Commissioner has sought to reduce the profitability of
these transactions by taxing the seller's proceeds as ordinary
income." One approach has been the assertion that the bootstrap
sale was a sham and the proceeds constituted dividend payments
to the sellers 2 or some other form of ordinary income.' 8 Success
depends on showing an intent to bail out the retained earnings
and profits at capital gains rates and then to permit the business
to revert to the seller."' In Brown, however, a bona fide transfer
admittedly was intended."
Alternatively, the Commissioner has admitted that the boot-
strap was a bona fide transaction but has asserted that it failed
to meet the more stringent requirements necessary for recognition
10. See MacCracken, supra note 7, at 212.
11. See Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1955); Union Bank
v. United States, 285 F.2d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961); Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 80
T.C. 909 (1958), afd sub nom. Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 882 (1st
Cir. 1959); W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 488 (1957); Emanuel N. Kolkey, 27 T.C.
37 (1956), affd, 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958); Rev. Rul. 54-420, 1954-2 Cum.
BuLL. 128.
12. See Estate of Ernest G. Howes, supra note 11, at 920.
13. See Caldwell v. Campbell, 218 Fad 567, 569 (5th Cir. 1955), in which
the Commissioner argued that the transaction was an assignment of income
and therefore taxable to the transferor as ordinary income. See also the instant
case, 87 T.C. at 483, in which the Commissioner did not equate the proceeds
with any particular form of income.
14. See id. at 484; Estate of Ernest G. Howes, so T.C. 909, 920 (1958),
aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.2d 382 (1st Cir. 1959).
15. The Commissioner did not appeal from the Tax Court's determination
of the existence of a bona fide transaction. In so holding the Tax Court relied
on the following facts: (a) It was the Institute which approached the peti-
tioners concerning the sale (the court felt that normally the seller would insti-
tute negotiations if an elaborate plan for only temporary transfer of assets
was contemplated); (b) the Institute took steps to ascertain the real
worth of petitioners' business (taken by the court to indicate an intention on
the part of the Institute to enter into a profitable transaction); (c) Fortuna
was organized with more than nominal capital contribution by petitioners'
attorney (taken to indicate he must have intended to receive a reasonable
return on his investment which could only have been accomplished by a real
and lasting transfer). See 87 T.C. at 486.
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as a sale under the capital gains provisions." The Code affords no
definition of "sale ... of a capital asset."' 7 However, the courts
have not found transfer of legal title determinative. Bona fide
sales have been denied tax recognition where the seller has re-
tained an interest, indefinite in duration, in the future earnings
of the transferred property.'8
The most basic, or at least the most cited test used by courts
in determining whether a particular transaction should be afforded
tax recognition is the "business purpose" doctrine put forth by the
court in Gregory v. Helvering." In Gregory the Court refused
taxpayer the tax advantages of a reorganization because the pur-
ported reorganization was performed as a means of tax avoidance
and did not accomplish the business purpose for which it was
enacted. "[T]he principle laid down in the Gregory case is not
limited to corporate reorganizations, but rather applies to the
federal taxing statutes generally."o The Gregory doctrine applies
where the question is whether the characterization urged by the
taxpayer accords with "substantial economic reality."2 '
The Commissioner has successfully attacked only one boot-
strap sale. It is not clear whether the court in Kolkey v. Com-
missioner" found the transaction a sham or held that the trans-
fer, although otherwise legitimate, was not a sale for capital gains
purposes. Although the Brown court read Kolkey as limited to
holding the transaction a sham, the facts were consistent with
16. Compare the instant case, 325 Fad 313 (9th Cir. 1963), and Union
Bank v. United States, 285 F.d 126 (Ct. Cl. 1961), with Commissioner v.
Johnson, 267 F.2d 882 (1st Cir. 1959), and W. H. Truschel, 29 T.C. 43 (1957).
In the latter two cases the Commissioner argued that the transaction should
be considered a statutory reorganization and the proceeds should be taxed
as dividends, while in the former two cases the Commissioner did not attempt
to classify the proceeds, but merely asserted that they were not eligible for
capital gains treatment.
17. See note 4 supra.
18. In the cases dealing with the sale of natural resources, the courts have
denied capital gains treatment to the proceeds received by the seller where
the amount to be received is made dependent upon the future extractions
made by the purchaser. See Palmer v. Bender, 287 U.S. 551 (1933); Brunet
v. Harmel, 287 U.S. 103 (1932); Laudenslager v. Commissioner, 305 F.2d 686
(3d Cir. 1962); 4 \ERTENs, FEERAL INcoAM TAXATION § 24.54 (1960).
The loss resulting from a sale of securities by a taxpayer to a corporation
in which he held all the stock was denied tax recognition in one case on the
grounds that taxpayer had the same control over the securities before the
transfer as after. Higgins v. Smith, 808 U.S. 473 (1940).
19. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
20. Weller v. Commissioner, 270 F.2d 294, 297 (3d Cir. 1959).
21. Gilbert v. Commissioner, 248 F.2d 399, 406 (2d Cir. 1957).
92. 254 F.2d 51 (7th Cir. 1958), affrming 97 T.C. 37 (1956).
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either conclusion. 3 The sale price so exceeded the fair market
value of the business that the earnings could not reasonably be
expected to meet the installment payments. The corporation
formed to run the business on behalf of the charitable purchaser
was unrealistically capitalized at the equity to debt ratio of 1 to
3,600, and the original sellers obtained ownership of its stock
within a year. In addition, the court emphasized the retention
by the sellers of control and economic risk and the absence of
new capital and management in refusing to allow a sale for capital
gains purposes. The court sustained characterization of the notes
and payments received by the putative sellers as equity capital
in the purchasing corporation and dividends respectively.
It has been said that a sale will be recognized for tax purposes
only when an examination of the economic realities reveals that
a meaningful transfer has occurred. 4 In the instant case the Com-
missioner asserted that there was no such meaningful economic
transfer because "certain normal aspects of the sale of a business
were missing."2 5 He suggested that precedent required "(1) shift
of business risk; (2) shift of benefit of income; [and] (3) shift of
operational control . . ." to qualify as a sale under the statute."
In Brown most characteristics of a normal sale were present
in some degree.2 7 The extent of the sellers' control over the busi-
ness was greatly decreased. Although one seller retained manage-
ment powers comparable with those he had formerly possessed,
the sellers no longer held control through stock ownership.
Twenty percent of the income was shifted to Fortuna and eight
percent to the Institute over the installment period.28 By agree-
ing to a fixed and reasonable selling price,29 the sellers were fore-
closed from sharing in any increased future profitability. Although
23. 37 T.C. at 487; accord, Union Bank v. United States, 285 F.2d 126
(Ct. Cl. 1961); Estate of Ernest G. Howes, 30 T.C. 909, 925 (1958), af'd ub
nom. Commissioner v. Johnson, 267 F.d 382 (1st Cir. 1959). It has been
suggested that the Kolkey court went beyond the sham rationale and inquired
into the economic realities involved. See Lanning, supra note 7, at 641.
24. Lanning, 8upra note 7, at 647; see Moore & Dohan, supra note 7, at 91.
25. 325 F.2d at 315.
26. Ibid.
27. The instant court found present all the elements of a meaningful
economic transfer which the Commissioner had asserted were lacking. 325
F.2d at 315.
28. 325 F.2d at 315.
29. The Tax Court in the instant case did not state that the price was
a reflection of fair market value but merely held that it was within a "reason-
able range." 37 T.C. at 486. The court found the business outlook to be good
and that past earnings had averaged $300,000 per annum. The actual purchase
price of the stock was $1,175,000 (the $1,300,000 figure included $125,000 in
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the sellers retained some risk because the purchaser was not
liable on the notes, their interest was secured by a mortgage.
Nevertheless, some elements characterizing a sale were absent -
for instance, an element of investment and/or assumption of
personal liability by the purchaser. Therefore, in reviewing the
instant case the Supreme Court might rely on the absence of
these factors to reverse the decision below.
The Internal Revenue Code offers another line of attack to
prevent a charity from passing along the benefits of its tax exempt
status to sellers of businesses&0 The charitable exemption is con-
ditioned upon the charity's revenue not inuring to private use.3
Arguably, the Commissioner could subject all of the charity's
income to taxation, because the revenue from the business inures
to the private seller's benefit. 2 A less harsh alternative would be
to apply the unrelated business income provisions33 and tax the
charity at ordinary rates on its receipt of the earnings of the
business. These provisions were added to the Code in 1950 for
the purpose of equalizing competition between charities and tax-
able entities in purchasing businesses." Congress preserved the
charitable exemption for "passive" income deriving from unre-
lated businesses.3 Thus, in the instant case the charity leased
the assets to Fortuna for a percentage of the profits, thereby re-
ceiving income from the business in the form of rent, which is
exempted from the unrelated business income tax. In view of the
purpose of the 1950 legislation and the terms of the lease, it would
seem appropriate to characterize the charity's receipts from the
operation of the business as taxable income despite the form of
the transaction.3
Judicial reluctance to accept the Commissioner's position in
attacks on the seller of the business may be due to its inherent
notes which were transferred to the purchaser) -less than four times average
annual earnings.
30. See Lanning, supra note 7, at 682-89.
81. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3).
32. See Lanning, supra note 7, at 682-84, 686-87.
33. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, H§ 511-14.
34. See H.R. REP. No. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 36 (1950), in 1950-2
Cum. BuzL. 380, 408-11; Note, 60 YALE L.J. 879, 887 (1951); Comment, 60
YALE LJ. 851 (1951).
35. Congress expressly excluded the following from "unrelated income":
interest, royalties, annuities, and rents (except business leases). INT. REV. CODE
or 1954, § 512(b); see Comment, 60 YALE LJ. 851, 855 (1951). Rents from
a business lease qualify for exemption if made for five years or less. INT. REV.
CODE OP 1954, § 514(b).
36. See Lanning, supra note 7, at 687-89.
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unfairness. Taxation of the entire proceeds as ordinary income
deprives the seller of his basis in the stock or assets of the business.
A partial legislative solution would be to permit capital gains
treatment of the excess of fair market value of the business"7 over
the seller's basis, and to tax the excess of the price received over
fair market value as ordinary income to the seller." Bootstrap
sales to charities would not thereby be prohibited, but exempt
organizations and other purchasers of businesses would be placed
on a more equal competitive basis. The charity would still be able
to pay a better price because of its exempt status, but the in-
creased price would not be worth as much to the seller because
of the imposition of tax at ordinary rates on the excess received.
The seller would not be deprived of capital gains treatment on
the portion of the price received not depending on the charity's
tax status, and the Commissioner's loss of revenue would be
reduced.
Copyright Law: Broadcast of Phonograph Records Held
a "Public Performance for Profit" in Violation of
Section 1(e) Even Though Made in Connection
With Sale of the Records
The defendant owned and operated a Merchandise Mart con-
taining a music department' in Middleton, Pennsylvania, for
which it handled all advertising. Both advertising announcements
and phonograph records were broadcast from defendant's offices
within the Mart, and on stipulated dates defendant broadcast
phonograph recordings of plaintiffs' copyrighted musical compo-
sitions over its loudspeaker system throughout the premises and
parking lot of the Mart. Plaintiffs sued for damages alleging a
violation of their exclusive right to perform their copyrighted
works publicly for profit as provided in Section 1(e) of the Copy-
87. If the sale in the instant case had not occurred and one of the peti-
tioners were to die, a determination of a fair market value of the business
would have to be made for estate tax purposes. For guidelines to be used in
the determination of the fair market value of a closely held corporation, see
Rev. Rul. 59-60,1959-1 CuM. Buzz. 237.
88. The existing statute does not appear to permit this result. Therefore,
it is suggested as possible legislation.
1. The music department was leased from defendant by Mid-City Trading
Company.
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